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Recently, Peter Drucker stated that less than one fifth of the workforce nowadays are blue-
collar workers doing manual work, while white-collar workers doing knowledge work make 
up two fifths of the workforce. Yet, when it comes to our understanding of a knowledge 
worker’s productivity, we are “in the year 2000 roughly where we were in the year 1900 in 
terms of productivity of the manual worker” (Drucker 1999, p. 83). If companies could 
enhance productivity of knowledge workers in the 21
st century as much as they did of manual 
workers in the 20
th century, the payoffs would be astronomical.  
This article will describe new ways of managing the human resources function in 
organizations of knowledge workers and how this can enable knowledge creation. To 
understand the task of introducing new human resource policies in knowledge worker 
organizations it is important to see how human resources management is still shaped to a 
large extent by ideas on how to manage manual work. In order to gain new insights on how to 
enhance the productivity of knowledge workers as dramatically as was the case with manual 
workers in the past, it is necessary to start by asking what are the main similarities and what 
are the main differences between traditional manual work and knowledge work in firms.  
 
Similarities Between Manual and Knowledge Teamwork  
Basically, all work inside firms – whether traditional work or knowledge work – is teamwork. 
The word “team” indicates that the employees are interdependent. Together, team members 
can produce a higher output than the sum of the separate outputs of each team member 
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working independently. This is just as true for manual workers jointly lifting cargo into a 
truck as it is for knowledge workers jointly designing a new software product. A team or a 
firm thus creates what is commonly known as synergy. The more effort exerted by one 
person, the more productive other members of the team become. Creating synergies is 
precisely what makes it advantageous to organize people in firms instead of depending wholly 
on market transactions (Simon 1991).  
At the same time creating synergies constitute what is sometimes called a collective good. A 
collective good is a good that can be used by people who have not contributed their share to 
its production. This is the case in team production. When a product or service (a “good”) is 
produced by a team effort it is often impossible to know which of the members contributed to 
it and which did not. It is hard to determine what input each of the team members has 
contributed to the joint output. Some team members could freeride at the cost of others. The 
possibility of freeriders on a team can result in poor performance. While most team members 
would no doubt prefer to contribute their share to the team’s task, the suspicion that some may 
not can inhibit their contribution. Thus the purpose of the team – its potential to produce more 
than the members could individually – is not achieved. This problem is sometimes called a 
“social dilemma.” It characterizes situations in which the actions of rational and self-
interested individuals lead to situations of collective irrationality in which everyone is worse 
off. A “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) may arise, which exemplifies the true 
meaning of a tragedy: Each team member is fully aware of the situation and realizes that their 
action leads to a negative outcome and “every team member would prefer a team in which no 
one, not even himself, shirked” (Alchian & Demsetz 1972, p. 790). Individuals would be 
happy to enjoy that good at the cost of their individual contribution, if there were a guarantee 
that everyone else would contribute their share. However, a rational selfish single person is 
unable to solve such dilemmas on his own. If all or most of the team members free ride, the 
collective good will not be achieved, or will at least be undersupplied. Synergies will not be 
created. This is the reason why solving social dilemmas is at the heart of human resources 
management in firms (Miller 1992). 
The traditional solution in manual work to social dilemmas was to give supervisor the right to 
punish shirking. This is exactly what Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford preached. Owners or 
managers could oversee production workers and assess their individual productivity. A 
strictly horizontal and vertical division of labor – making it clear what each worker’s job was   3
– made supervision work. It enabled owners, managers or engineers to control the inputs and 
measure outputs of employees. Supervision includes all human resources tasks, in particular 
selection, instruction, observation of individual effort, sanctioning and rewarding, as well as 
adjusting the terms of measuring the productivity of individual workers. Does this traditional 
solution to solve social dilemmas work when manual work is replaced by knowledge work? 
 
Differences Between Manual and Knowledge Teamwork 
Most work is now no longer manual but knowledge teamwork. Teams are the fundamental 
learning units in modern organizations and there is increasing recognition that collective work 
in teams is the most efficient way of creating knowledge. Therefore it is vital to understand 
the differences in obstacles to overcoming social dilemmas in knowledge teams from those in 
manual teams. There are three main differences. 
Firstly, in contrast to manual teamwork, pure knowledge work raises productivity of the team 
only if different knowledge is dispersed among different people (Hayek 1945). If all 
knowledge workers in teams have the same knowledge, one person could do the whole job 
almost entirely alone. This difference between knowledge teamwork and manual teamwork 
becomes quite clear if you compare a team of workers lifting cargo into a truck with a team of 
fashion designers. Fashion designers do creative work and need to integrate diverse 
knowledge about e.g. production processes, the garment, CAD software and marketing. If the 
team leader knows and learns what her subordinates know and learn, then she could create the 
design herself. If she does not know what their subordinates know, then she can neither 
monitor whether her subordinates have chosen the most productive activities nor whether they 
shirk. The only thing she can do is to evaluate whether certain professional standards are met. 
If the outputs are marketable products or modularized tasks, she could use and benchmark the 
team’s output without understanding how the good was produced, just as you can use certain 
software without knowing how it works. But this does not help to prevent shirking by 
individual team members producing new software or new fashion designs. If the team`s 
output is not measurable, the situation is even worse. An example is knowledge created within 
the fashion design team. To evaluate such knowledge, the supervisor must be an expert 
herself. But, if this is the case, teamwork will not produce much knowledge which exceeds   4
the supervisor’s knowledge. As a result, knowledge workers in teams are in a good position to 
hide their expertise vis-à-vis their superiors (Davenport & Prusack 1998).  
Secondly, the result of joint knowledge work is at least in part new explicit knowledge which 
can easily be disseminated and further developed by all members of the firm. This new 
knowledge is seen as the feedstock of competitive advantage. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), 
in their famous SECI-model, have clearly illustrated how organizational learning proceeds by 
integrating more and more tacit and explicit knowledge to become collective explicit 
knowledge. The access to this knowledge – for example knowledge that is collected in an 
electronic database – is unrestricted to members of the firm. It is a firm specific common 
good, while individual tacit knowledge is a private good which can by excluded from 
freeriders. If an employee makes his individual tacit knowledge explicit, he changes a private 
good into a common good. Why should he do that? By making his tacit knowledge explicit, 
he may gain some reputation, but at the same time lose his competitive edge. Sharing 
knowledge with colleagues may negatively affect an employee’s ability to outperform them. 
In addition he enables his supervisor to monitor him more effectively. As a result, selfish 
knowledge workers in teams are not only in a better position, but they also have an incentive 
to hide their expertise vis-à-vis their superiors and colleagues. 
Thirdly, knowledge workers have much more bargaining power vis-à-vis the owners or 
managers than manual workers. They cannot be easily replaced. Consider the example of the 
team of workers lifting cargo into a truck. These workers can be trained quickly and their 
skills can be easily transferred. They could be paid the going wage rates in a competitive 
labor market. In contrast, knowledge workers are a critical resource to the firm, because their 
abilities must be idiosyncratic to enhance the productivity of teams. This goes hand in hand 
with a changing balance of power between knowledge capital and financial capital (Rajan & 
Zingales 2004) Financial capital is crucial in traditional firms to exploit economies of scale of 
physical work. Today flourishing financial markets have made financial capital less critical as 
a source of power. Rather, knowledge capital has become the critical resource. The changes 
that have taken place are best summed up in the following statistic: In 1929, 70 percent of the 
top income earners came from holdings of capital. In 1998, only 20 percent come from capital 
and 80 percent from wages and entrepreneurial income (Fogel 2000, p. 219). In general, 
knowledge workers have gained considerable power compared to the owners of financial 
capital. Within firms, this power is dependent on the degree of knowledge specific to each   5
firm. It is true that this kind of knowledge makes the employee also more vulnerable to the 
employer. If the employer fires him, he not only loses his wage, but also a large amount of 
human capital he has built up. But if the employer threatens to do this, then the employee will 
“underinvest” in his firm specific knowledge without the employer being able to control this 
underinvestment efficiently. As a consequence, the competitive advantage of the firm will 
suffer.  
To summarize, to the extent that teamwork contains knowledge work, traditional tools of 
human resources management built on supervision and control will fail. To raise productivity 
of knowledge teamwork, we have to look for new solutions to solve the inherent social 
dilemmas.  
 
New Approaches for Human Resources Management of Knowledge Teamwork: 
Structural or Motivational?  
Joint knowledge teamwork is crucial not only to enhance productivity by creating synergies, 
but also because it is the source of competitive advantages for the firm, which is hard to 
imitate. Today, there is a growing conviction among companies, researchers and consultants 
that joint knowledge work is the most important source of dynamic capabilities, which are 
unique and hard to imitate or substitute. What new solutions need to be found by human 
resources management in order for these goals to be fulfilled? How can social dilemmas be 
overcome and at the same time enhance the sources for sustainable competitive advantage?  
The suggestions discussed for solving social dilemmas can be divided into structural and 
motivational solutions. Structural solutions change the rules of the game to make cooperation 
more attractive for selfish employees. These approaches are preferred by economists and 
human resources managers, who believe that compensation policy is the most important part 
of their job. Motivational solutions focus on the change of preferences of employees. They are 
preferred by social psychologists or human resources managers, who believe that preferences 
are not given but are plastic. They can be altered by the work content itself as well as by the 
work environment. 
Structural solutions   6
Activating the ”shadow of the future”: The most influential proposal for solving social 
dilemmas is to extend the shadow of the future by long-term, reciprocal relationships 
(Axelrod 1984). A “win-win” situation may arise. However, it is often disregarded that this 
strategy only works on condition that individuals have information as to how the other 
persons behaved in the past. The more team knowledge is dispersed and tacit, the less this 
strategy is likely to be applicable. 
Selective incentives: A selective incentive is a private good (e.g. a bonus) given to individuals 
as an inducement to contribute to a common good. All firm members may have access to the 
electronic database, but only contributors receive a reward. However, selective incentives 
raise two problems. Firstly they increase costs, and secondly you might subsidize hot air. 
Take the case of a reward for contributions made to an electronic database. As a result, you 
might get a high number of contributions with little value. If you count the downloads, the 
value of the contribution might work. However, it might also happen that the contributors 
induce their colleagues to download their contributions. You have become the victim of “the 
folly of rewarding A while hoping for B” (Kerr 1975) This is true in particular for knowledge 
work. Knowledge work contains some easy to measure components (e.g. pages of written 
text) and some hard to measure components (e.g. the importance of a text). Reward systems 
have to concentrate on few clear cut criteria. As a consequence, rational employees will focus 
on the easily measurable components and leave aside the components that are not so easy to 
measure.  
Profit Centers: One frequently discussed structural solution to social dilemmas is to 
decentralize decision authority into profit centers or modules so that internal market forces 
can do their work via (transfer-)prices. The leader of the profit centers could then be 
remunerated according to measurable criteria. However, there are some problems with 
knowledge work organized as profit centers. Firstly, the leader of the profit centers has no 
incentive to share knowledge voluntarily with other profit centers, because then she would be 
giving away strategic opportunities for free. This is especially true for tacit knowledge. The 
transfer of tacit knowledge can be less well monitored compared to the transfer of explicit 
knowledge (Osterloh & Frey 2000). Secondly, the sources of hard to imitate competitive 
advantages will be undermined. In order to be able to bargain over (transfer-)prices and 
service level agreements across the boundaries of profit centers, some tacit knowledge must   7
be made explicit. As a consequence, the knowledge incorporated in the profit centers may 
become more tradeable and imitable (Chesbrough & Teece 1996).  
To summarize, structural solutions might mitigate some problems of joint knowledge work.  
But the more the knowledge is complex and dispersed between employees the more structural 
solutions even worse the problem. In these cases structural solutions must be replaced by 
motivational solutions.  
 
Motivational Solutions 
As Simon (1991, p. 31-32) stated, “in most organizations, employees contribute much more to 
goal achievement than the minimum that could be extracted from them by supervisory 
enforcement...”. This makes clear that motivation is a main factor inside of firms. This is true 
for manual work as well as for knowledge work. A highly motivated workforce keeps costs of 
supervision and monetary incentives low. But as far as knowledge work is concerned, 
“management by motivation” (Frey & Osterloh 2002) might not only save costs, but become 
the most important factor in sustaining a competitive advantage. As tacit knowledge is the 
main source of inimitability, and its creation and transfer cannot be monitored and 
remunerated accordingly, motivation and, in particular, intrinsic motivation are the keys to 
dynamic capabilities as a foundation of long-term strategy.  
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation 
Two kinds of motivation can be distinguished: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. In reality, 
pure extrinsic motivation and pure intrinsic motivation are extremes on a continuum. 
Extrinsic motivation serves to satisfy indirect needs, for example money. As such, money is 
almost always the means to an end – for example, paying for a vacation or buying a car – and 
not an end in itself. In this instance, a job is simply a tool with which to satisfy one’s needs by 
means of the salary it pays. Structural solutions focus mainly on extrinsic motivation. As 
discussed, they can mitigate social dilemmas, but cannot solve it with knowledge work. 
Intrinsic motivation works through immediate need satisfaction. An activity is valued for its 
own sake and is undertaken without any reward except the activity itself (Deci & Ryan 1985).   8
Intrinsic motivation is fostered by commitment to the work, according to the saying “If you 
want people motivated to do a good job, give them a good job to do”. If employees are 
motivated intrinsically, then shirking is not a preferable action, because the activity causes a 
benefit instead of a cost. The social dilemma disappears and a “win-win” situation arises. 
There are two kinds of intrinsic motivation: enjoyment based motivation and prosocial 
motivation. 
Enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation refers to a satisfying flow of activity. Examples are 
skiing, playing a game, reading a good novel, climbing a mountain or solving an interesting 
puzzle. In each case, pleasure is derived from the activity itself and not by the compensation. 
During such activities, people often report a “flow experience”(Csikszentmihalyi 1975) that 
makes them lose track of time. The individual acts as a “homo ludens” (Huizinga 1986), the 
playful human being. Recently, in one of the most innovative industries – the software 
industry – this kind of motivation turned out to be crucial. One of the most successful kinds of 
software is open source software like Linux, which has become a serious competitor of 
Microsoft. It is produced voluntarily as a public good that everybody can download from the 
Internet. This is done to a large extent without monetary compensation and private intellectual 
property rights. Important contributors to open source software, like Linus Torvalds, report 
that they are doing the programming “just for fun” (Torvalds & Diamond 2001). A “flow 
experience” is often reported by all kinds of creative work.  
Prosocial intrinsic motivation takes the wellbeing of others into account without expecting a 
reward. The welfare of the community enters into the preferences of the individuals. A wealth 
of empirical evidence demonstrates that many people are indeed prepared to contribute to the 
common good of their company and community (Frey 1997). Individuals feel better if they 
have observed group norms like ethical standards, professional codes of practice, or norms of 
fairness, reciprocity or team spirit. Empirical work shows that due to different group norms 
substantial differences exist in shirking between branches of a company, despite identical 
monetary incentives (Ichino & Maggi 2000). Two major instances in real life have been 
discussed , which both include sacrificing individual interests for the sake of the whole 
company. 
-  Voluntary rule following. People are prepared to follow rules and regulations that limit 
their self-interests without sanctions, as long as they accept their legitimacy (Tyler & 
Blader 2000).   9
-  Extra-role behavior. Employees do not only observe rules voluntarily, but also exert 
“organizational citizenship behavior” (Organ & Ryan 1995). They provide voluntary 
inputs, going far beyond the duties stipulated in their employment contracts. “Extra-
role behavior” is thought of as a “willingness to cooperate”. Of particular interest are 
helping behavior, organizational compliance and “whistle blowing” if rules of conduct 
are violated, e.g. in the recent corporate scandals. “Whistleblowers” disclosed 
malpractices to their bosses and risked the costs of being punished or even dismissed.  
Laboratory experiments also reveal that a large number of people voluntarily contribute to 
common goods (see the survey by Rabin 1998). They show that a large number of people are 
willing to punish unfair behavior at a cost to themselves. It is important to note that these 
laboratory experiments have found, that there are considerable variations across different 
cultures (Henrich et al. 2001). This indicates that prosocial motivation is not “hardwired”. It 
can be changed by institutional measures. It is the most important task of human resources 
management to provide such measures. 
 
How to Foster Intrinsic Motivation  
It is more difficult to guide intrinsically motivated persons to work according to the particular 
goals of the firm than to guide persons who work mainly for monetary compensation. Firstly, 
intrinsic motivation cannot be enforced. It can only be enabled. Secondly, firms are not 
interested in enabling some kind of intrinsic motivation; say the pleasure of reading a novel 
during office hours. In contrast, extrinsic rewards can easily focus the motivation of 
employees on the firm’s goal. However, some measures, which strengthen extrinsic 
motivation to induce them to pursue the firm’s goals, weaken intrinsic motivation. The 
question arises how human resources management can induce the kind of intrinsic motivation 
that is required.  
Self-determination theory offers an answer (Deci & Ryan 2000). According to this theory, the 
preconditions of being intrinsically motivated for a certain job are autonomy, feelings of 
competence and social relatedness. Interventions of human resource management have to 
question whether they crowd in (increase) or crowd out (decrease) intrinsic motivation by 
increasing or decreasing these three preconditions.    10
Autonomy 
Autonomy is the most important precondition for creativity, complex problem solving and 
conceptual work (e.g. Amabile 1998). A well known example how to enhance productivity by 
enlarging autonomy is 3M (Gundling 2000). 3M is one of the most innovative companies: 30 
percent of their sales come from products new to the market. It has introduced the famous 15 
percent rule. 3M employees are allowed to spend 15 percent of their time on individual 
research or initiatives. At the beginning of each innovation process – in the so-called 
“doodling phase” - management tends to be absent. In addition, 3M has established a strong 
culture of camaraderie. 
The perception of autonomy decrease if people perceive that their self-determination is 
reduced, when doing an intrinsically interesting activity. People feel that they are not the 
origins of their behavior. Their attention shifts from the activity itself to the reward or 
sanction. The content of the activity loses its importance. Note, that this is only the case if the 
individuals were intrinsically motivated in the first place. Only then this motivation can be 
undermined. In contrast, in situations where no intrinsic motivation exists in the first place, 
monetary rewards can increase performance, like simple manual work on an assembly line. 
Lazear (1999) provides an empirical example. He found that, in a large auto glass company, 
productivity increased from between 20 percent to 36 percent when the firm switched from 
paying hourly wages to piece rates. Knowledge teamwork is very different from that kind of 
jobs. 
The crowding-out phenomenon has been firmly established by numerous laboratory and field 
experiments (for an overview, see Frey & Jegen 2001). An impressive field experiment shows 
that monetary rewards can undermine prosocial motivation. Gneezy & Rustichini (2000a) 
analyzed the behavior of school children collecting money voluntarily, i.e. without monetary 
compensation (e.g. for cancer research or disabled children). The children reduced their 
efforts by about 36 percent when they were promised a bonus of one percent of the money 
collected. Their effort to collect for a good cause could be raised when the bonus was 
increased from one to 10 percent of the money collected, but they did not reach the initial 
collection level again. This field experiment shows clearly that there are two countervailing 
forces affecting behavior: a crowding-out effect of rewards and an effect of motivating the 
children extrinsically after the intrinsic motivation has been decreased. It also shows that a   11
“hidden cost of rewards” exists. The money collected after having been given a bonus comes 
at a high price compared to strengthening intrinsic motivation. 
Feelings of competence 
Feelings of competence grow when individuals understand what they are doing and when 
they feel responsible for the outcome. Researchers have shown that when people are 
encouraged to feel that they are competent they make a greater contributions to the 
community (e.g. Kollock 1998). But there are two important preconditions: 
Firstly, individuals must get positive feedback about the outcome of their contributions that 
does not eclipse their feelings of autonomy. Feedback on outcomes only strengthens intrinsic 
motivation if it is perceived as supporting rather than controlling. This condition makes 
feedback-processes one of the most important measures of human resources management, and 
at the same time makes it the most difficult measure to handle.  
-  On the one hand, feedback about outputs or processes can be supplied by supervisors, 
team-leaders, or peers only if there are measurable outputs, or if there is a sufficient 
overlap of knowledge between them. As we have argued, fulfilling these conditions 
with knowledge teamwork sometimes comes at a high price. If team leaders are only 
able to control some easy to measure task components, then the “the folly of rewarding 
A while hoping for B” will arise. Too much overlap of knowledge will decrease the 
productivity of creating new knowledge. In these cases, human resources management 
must rely on other tools, in particular giving the employees a feedback about having 
observed professional or social norms. 
-  On the other hand, if it is possible to get efficient feedback from the supervisor, they 
must be very careful not to act in a controlling way. This explains why the crowding-
out effect is stronger with monetary rewards than with symbolic rewards, and why the 
effect is greater with expected rather than with unexpected rewards. Experiments show 
that if labor contracts are regarded primarily as a “gift exchange” (Akerlof 1982) 
rather than as a disciplining tool, then employees exert more effort. In a telling 
experiment, two different settings were compared. In the first setting, the “principals” 
offered a fixed amount of money and the “agents” chose an effort level. In the second 
setting, the principals had to make a choice between a fixed wage and a piece rate  
scheme and then the agents chose their effort level. In this setting efforts were higher   12
when fixed wages were offered compared to the case when piece rates were offered. 
Also, in the case of fixed pay agents mentioned the well being of the principal 
significantly more often than in the case of piece rates (Irlenbusch & Sliwka 2003). 
The social norm of reciprocity, which worked in the fixed pay setting setting, was 
crowded-out in the piece rate setting. This provides a strong argument for fixed wages 
whenever intrinsic motivation is crucial.  
Secondly, individuals must believe that their participation is important for the provision of the 
common good. Then they ask, “What happens if I stop contributing?” When people believe 
that their actions will have a discernible effect on the value of the common good, they will be 
more likely to contribute to it. There are two ways which enhance responsibility for the 
outcome (Cabrera & Cabrera 2002). One way is to give informational feedback whenever 
other team members have received and used the posted contributions. It is important not to 
link such information to monetary rewards to avoid the “the folly of rewarding A while 
hoping for B” and the crowding-out effect. Rather, the rewards should be symbolic. An 
example would be to honor an employee with an award for helping behavior which is made 
visible widely. The second way to improve perceived impact on the value of the common 
good is by supplying training for the providers as well as the recipients of information. People 
might not get feedback on their contributions for two reasons. They might not know which 
information is most valuable for others and how they could present it effectively. Or the 
possible receivers might not be able to use efficient knowledge sharing systems or electronic 
databases. In both cases, training can increase responsibility for the collective outcome.  
Social relatedness 
Perceived social relatedness is of special importance for prosocial motivation. It raises group 
identity that has proven to have a strong impact on the amount of contributions to common 
goods (e.g. Kollock 1998). Human resources management has a variety of measures to 
enhance social relatedness and group identification.  
Distributive fairness. The more people feel they are treated fairly, the more likely they are to 
identify with a group. Fairness can be divided into distributive fairness, procedural fairness, 
and fairness of contributions to a common good. Distributive fairness concerns whether 
people believe that outcomes or rewards are allocated to people in a justified manner. 
Empirical evidence shows that people are less concerned about what they earn in terms of 
absolute income, compared to what they earn relative to their close colleagues (Adams 1963).   13
Different fairness norms exist under different conditions. In settings when performance varies 
considerably between individuals and is easy to measure, equity according to individual 
outcomes is the prevailing criteria. As already mentioned, individual performance is hard to 
measure where knowledge work in teams is concerned. In such situations, equality is often 
considered to be fair. In close social settings, such as families or close-knit groups, the norm 
of need is often applied. Elements of need are also found in work settings, for example when 
supplements to wages are paid according to the number of children. In any case, what matters 
is not fairness in an objective sense, but rather what employees perceive to be a fair 
distribution. A lot depends on cultural, occupational and demographic factors and may vary 
across industries. Human resources management has to find out empirically which fairness 
norms prevail in which subsets. Whatever criteria is applied, one can suppose that the 
exorbitant salaries paid to top managers, as was recently revealed in the media, were 
perceived as extremely unfair. When superiors resort to feathering their own nests, it is no 
wonder that, under such conditions, employees are no longer prepared to contribute to the 
common good of the firm, e.g. by reporting colleagues whose behavior is not acceptable or by 
revealing knowledge voluntarily  to the community and thereby giving up a competitive edge 
(Frey & Osterloh 2005). 
Procedural fairness. While distributive fairness is related to outcomes, procedural fairness is 
related to the process leading to the outcome. Empirical evidence shows that procedural 
fairness impacts the willingness to contribute to common goods and to follow rules more than 
distributive fairness. This is true even in situations that are not favorable to one’s own self-
interest (Tyler & Blader 2000). The characteristics that lead to perceived procedural fairness 
can be summarized as participation, neutrality, and being treated with dignity and respect. 
Participation gives individuals a process control or the use of voice. It has been found that the 
use of voice is not just dependent on controlling outcomes; people value the opportunity of 
expressing their views. As a consequence, in cases of conflict, mediation has proven to be 
perceived as a fairer procedure than formal trials. Mediation typically provides greater 
opportunity for participation than formal procedures. A precondition of neutrality is the belief 
of employees that their superiors do not allow personal advantages to enter their decision-
making. In laboratory experiments, it was shown that sanctions that served the punisher’s 
self-interests crowded out cooperative behavior, whereas sanctions perceived as prosocially 
motivated enhanced self-interests (Fehr & Rockenbach 2003). It follows that supervisors and 
team leaders, who lay down the rules and regulations, should not be given an incentive to   14
manipulate the corresponding criteria in their own favor. In management, the exact opposite 
took place in recent times: the top executives were given the opportunity to manipulate the 
criteria by which they were evaluated and compensated (Osterloh & Frey 2004). Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to maintain neutrality. Human resources management should not 
only be committed to rules of neutrality, but also make this commitment part of their written 
policy. Being treated with dignity and respect has proved to be of high importance for 
organizational citizenship behavior, including helping behavior, altruism and extra role 
behavior (Niehoff & Moormann 1993). Note that all three characteristics of procedural 
fairness (participation, neutrality and being treated with dignity and respect) are essentially 
unrelated to outcomes. Therefore, procedural fairness is crucial in situations which might lead 
to unfortunate results for the employees, e.g. in resolving conflicts or making decisions 
concerning promotions.  
Conditional Cooperation. A third form of fairness is related to contributions to common 
goods. The more people expect others to contribute to common goods, the more likely they 
are to do so themselves. They are conditional cooperators. On the other hand, many people 
are conditional defectors. As a consequence, prosocial intrinsic motivation deteriorates if too 
many people freeride. No one likes being the only one who contributes to a good cause and 
being a “sucker”. This is shown by overwhelming empirical evidence (e.g. Fischbacher, 
Gächter & Fehr 2001). It follows that an employee’s inclination to cooperate is undermined if 
he feels that his colleagues don’t pull their weight, which is often not observable in 
knowledge teams. Therefore, Human resources management should be aware of the 
importance of protecting the company from malefactors in the workforce and should give pro-
social preferences more weight in the selection process. This is important because a higher 
number of prosocially motivated employees increases conditional cooperation.  
Personal contacts. Communication, or other conditions reducing social distance between 
persons, increases contribution in public good games (Ledyard 1995; Frey & Bohnet 1995). 
Communication has two important effects. Firstly, experiments show that most people, after 
some minutes of talking to each other, have higher expectations of others’ cooperative 
behavior. If they believe that others do not freeride, their willingness to contribute increases 
(conditional cooperation). This effect is much stronger when communicating face-to-face than 
when communicating via the computer. Secondly, communication provides an opportunity to 
invite other individuals to cooperate. It has been shown that being personally asked enhances 
contributions to collective goods greatly. These results might be summarized in such a way   15
that the less the situation approximates to a competitive market, the more pro-social behavior 
is likely to be observed. The growing role that “communities of practice” and “epistemic 
communities” play in knowledge-based industries underpins the significance of personal 
contacts and communication (Orr 1990; Lave and Wenger 1991). Many large companies, like 
Microsoft, Xerox, or Daimler Benz, have realized that the kind of communities that are based 
on communication and personal contacts foster not only creativity but also social relatedness 
and identification within the group. 
Instructions. People seem to be inclined to do what they are asked to do, especially when the 
request comes from someone who is perceived as a legitimate authority. Instructions to 
cooperate in public good games raise the cooperation rate as much as 40 percent (Sally 1995). 
In real life settings, it is shown that people adhere to rules and accept the decisions of 
authorities they believe to be legitimate, even if it is not in their own self-interest to do so 
(Tyler 1990). This is contrary to what economists have taught us. They instruct people that it 
is clever to behave as a selfish homo oeconomicus, rather than risk appearing foolish or naïve. 
As a result, people behave in a selfish way: economics have to some extent become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Interestingly enough, most people overestimate the power of self-interest 
to affect the behavior of others, even when their own behavior was not primarily self-
interested (Miller & Ratner 1998). Human resources management can stop this self-fulfilling 
prophecy by providing employees with information about existing social norms and social 
behavior in their company and in their community. In addition, there could be public 
recognition and (non monetary) awards for helpful and caring behavior, as is the case with the 
company 3M.  
Framing of socially appropriate behavior. People are highly sensitive to signals about 
socially appropriate behavior. This became evident in an experiment. Players were divided 
into two groups. Each group played exactly the same game. The first group was told they 
were going to play “the Wall Street Game”. One third of the group cooperated. The second 
group was told that they were playing “the Community Game”. More than two thirds 
cooperated (Liberman, Samuels & Ross 2003). A strong framing effect was also shown in a 
field study, with parents being fined for picking up their children late from a childcare center. 
The fine had an adverse effect: it led to a significantly lower level of punctuality. When the 
fine was discontinued, punctuality remained at the lower level (Gneezy and Rustichini 
2000b). Fining switched the frame from a prosocial frame to a gain frame. The fine indicated 
that in the gain frame, it was socially acceptable that parents arrive too late. A similar affect   16
can be assumed with pay for performance. It signals that doing one’s duty without extra pay is 
not socially appropriate. This signal could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a 
consequence for human resources management, variable pay with knowledge work might be 
dangerous. Fixed pay, based on fair overall procedural evaluations, avoid framing the 
teamwork into the “Wall Street Game”.  
 
Conclusions 
Knowledge worker productivity is the biggest challenge of the 21
st century, in particular for 
developed countries. Making knowledge workers more productive, and contributing to a 
sustainable competitive advantage, requires profound changes in the thinking of human 
resources management. What are the main differences between principles of human resources 
management for manual and knowledge work?  
•  Pay for performance has had its day!  
As soon as knowledge work is prevailing in teams, pay for performance loses the status of 
“management mantra” that it achieved during recent years. Variable performance pay 
-  crowds out intrinsic motivation, which is needed for efficient knowledge creation in 
teams when supervision and control fail; 
-  shifts attention from the activity to the reward; 
- undermines  pro-social  behavior by providing a frame which tells employees that doing 
one’s duty is not socially appropriate; 
-  hinders the flow of knowledge between individuals and teams because employees are 
provided with incentives not to give up their competitive edge; 
-  subsidizes hot air with complex tasks by the “folly of rewarding A while hoping for 
B”;  
-  decreases competitive advantage of knowledge work. 
•  Strengthen autonomy, competence and social relatedness!   17
As pay for performance is no longer a remedy to solve social dilemmas in knowledge 
teamwork, it is important to strengthen feelings of autonomy, competence and social 
relatedness. The following measures are of particular importance: 
a.  fixed pay based on overall evaluations which, in the first place, have to be 
perceived as procedurally fair; 
b.  selection of intrinsically and prosocially motivated employees to make sure 
that conditional cooperation works; 
c.  supportive feedback that does not eclipse feelings of autonomy; 
d.  training for the providers and the recipients of knowledge to strengthen 
perceived efficacy; 
e.  providing opportunities for personal contacts and communication; 
f.  giving instructions about appropriate social behavior and avoiding gain frames 
in favor of normative frames of behavior.  
Some of these proposals clash with conventional wisdom but, based on existing research in 
economics and psychology, they promise to effectively raise the productivity of knowledge 
workers. At the same time they give knowledge work a hard to imitate competitive advantage. 
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